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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
-STATE OF MIND TO PROVE AN ACT:-
ROBERT M. HUTCHINS AND DONALD SLESINGER
Since Sugden v. St. Leonards I there has been a broad tendency
in this country to admit any statements of the testator made at
any time on ahy point relating to the execution, revocation, or
contents of the wil. 2 Whatever may have been the limiting ef-
fect of later English decisions,3 the American courts have in
general adhered to that doctrine and have accepted all its im-
plications. With the exception of a few jurisdictions impressed
by the res gestae requirement, 4 the philosophy of which in this
- The phrase state of mind in the law of evidence becomes important in
two classes of cases: where it is said to be in issue, and where it allows the
admission of words to prove an act. We are now concerned only with the
second class. Here the courts confine the evidence to proof of a future act,
regarding the state of mind required for the most part as plan, intention,
or design. In testamentary cases, on the other hand, the phrase sometimes
procures the admissibility of statements without regard to tense. We Lhall
attempt a legal analysis of the various rules and then a logical and pzy-
chological analysis of the points raised in the legal analysis.
For the background of these articles and references to others in the series,
see Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Obserratons on the Law of Evidcncc-
The Competency of Witnesses (1928) 37 Yale L. J. 1017, star note.
1 P. D. 154 (1876).
2 See Notes (1921) 6 CoRN. L. Q. 201; (1925) 38 HAnv. L. Rv. 959;
4 CHAMBERLAYNE, MODERN LAW OF EVWENCE (1913) § 2054; Matter of Page,
118 Ill. 576, 8 N. E. 852 (1886); McMurtrey v. Kopke, 250 S. W. 399 (Mo.
1923); Comment (1925) 19 ILL. L. REV. 577; Behrens v. Behrens, 47 Ohio
St. 323, 25 N. E. 209 (1890); (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 681; Barge v. Hamilton,
72 Ga. 568 (1884); In re Thompson's Estate, 200 Cal. 410, 253 Pac. 697
(1927); Maxwell v. Ford, 103 W. Va. 124, 136 S. E. 777 (1927); (1921)
16 ILL. L. Rnv. 244; (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 761; 3 WIGmORm, EVmENcIS
(2d ed. 1923) § 1736.
3 Atkinson v. Morris, [1897] P. 40; Woodward v. Goulstone, 11 App. Cas.
469 (1886).
4 (1928) 23 ILL. L. REV. 192; In re Campbell's Will, 138 Atl. 725 (Vt.
1927); Pennington v. Perry, 156 Ga. 103, 118 S. E. 710 (1923); ef. alszo
[283]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
connection is expounded in such cases as Throckmorton v. Holt 6
and Matter of Kennedy, our states have apparently taken the
view that since the person who knows most about the will is
dead, and since others are nof likely to be aware of his plans,
everything the testator said even remotely affecting those plans
may be admitted. Some courts insist that the evidence is ad-
missible only in corroboration of other evidence.' But the usual
rule seems to be unqualified. Prior, contemporaneous, or sub-
sequent utterances of the testator are admissible to show his
state of mind at the time of speaking, from which is inferred his
accomplishment of an act in accordance therewith.
This amounts, in effect, to a special exception to the hearsay
rule for the declarations of testators, and some courts have
*frankly said so., It is somewhat difficult to call the words, "My
will is in that box," a statement of presently existing state of
mind in the sense in which that phrase is used in other depart-
ments of the law of evidence. Ordinarily the state of mind must
be plan, intention, or design. In the great decision which must
be regarded as creating the exception for such declarations in
non-testamentary cases,9 the statement was expressive of a deter-
mination to leave Wichita. The declarant's letters were compet-
ent not ". . . as proof that he actually went away from Wichita,
but as evidence that, shortly before the time when other evidence
tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going,
and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both
that he did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had
been no proof of such intention." 10 This is just another way of
saying that the announcement of intention is some evidence that
the intention was carried out, and that the writer eventually got
to Crooked Creek. If he had said, "I am in Crooked Creek," or
"I have just left Crooked Creek," few courts would admit either
statement. When the House of Lords admitted such a declara-
tion,13 it was severely criticized 2 as altering the scope of the
hearsay rule and invading the province of the legislature. What
is commonly admitted in will cases, either under a special ex-
ception or that for presently existing state of mind is inadmissible
Siln v. Beitel, 289 S. W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Kingston v. Hines,
13 F. (2d) 406 (W. D. Mich. 1926).
5180 U. S. 552, 21 Sup. Ct. 474 (1900).
0 167 N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901).
7 Atherton v. Goslin, 239 S. W. 771 (Ky. 1922); see Hoppe v. Byers, 60
Md. 381, 393 (1883).
8 See, for example, In re Shelton's Will, 143 N. C. 218, 224, 55 S. E. 705,
707 (1906).. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. 909 (1892).
10 Ibid. 296, 12 Sup. Ct. at 913.
11 Lloyd v. Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co., [1913] 2 K. B. 130.
12Note (1915) 28 HARV. L. Ruv. 299.
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in other cases. Yet in these other cases if the speaker is dead
at the time of trial, as he was in Lloyd v. Powcl Duffrjy' Stean
Coal Co. 3 and in MutiuaZ Life Inzszranzce Co. 'V. Hillnzon,14 the
same necessity exists for the evidence that is present in litiga-
tion over a will. And on the surface, at least, there is no greater
guarantee of -trustworthiness in the one case than in the other.
The guarantee of trustworthiness which the courts find for
statements of presently existing state of mind is a comparative
guarantee. It is supposed that an utterance indicating presently
existing state of mind, reported by the person who heard it, will
be more accurate than the memory of that state of mind years
later. The announcement, "I am going to leave Wichita," will
more nearly reflect the then intention of the speaker than his
recollection at a trial in 1885 of what his plans were on Mlarch
3, 1879. The jury knows that plans are frequently not carried
out, and can give proper weight to expressions of them. Thus
Justice Gray in the Hillnon case deals with the trustworthiness
of the evidence as follows:
"... while he is still alive, his own memory of his state of
mind at a former time is no more likely to be clear and true than
a bystander's recollection of what he then said, and is lcss trst-
worthy than letters written by him at the very time and under
circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation." 25
(Italics ours).
The difficulty with Justice Gray's analysis is that he spoke as
though the only problem to be discussed were the method of
proving state of mind. The facts called for a decision on the
relative merits of various ways of proving an act. The question
in the Hillmon case was not whether Walters planned to leave
Wichita but whether he got to Crooked Creek. "His own mem-
ory of his state of mind at a former time" is therefore unim-
portant. What is important is his memory of his physical lo-
cation at a former time. If he is still alive and available nobody
wants to know from him what his state of mind was in the first
days of March, 1879. The question is where he was on March
17, 1879. The contrast, therefore, is not between his recollection
of his intentions and a bystander's recollection of what he then
said. It is between his recollection of his geographical position
and a bystander's recollection of what he then said it was going
to be. And as between these two brands of evidence there can
be little choice so far as trustworthiness is concerned. The com-
parison is between a sworn statement of fact subject to cross-ex-
amination in the presence of the jury and an unsworn statement
13 Svpra note 11.
'
14 Supra note 9.
15 Ibid. 295, 12 Sup. Ct. at 912.
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of design made out of court, purporting at most to be a report
of what the declarant said he then had in mind.
The decisions upon which Justice Gray relies indicate the
source of the difficulty. In his effort to hold the evidence ad-
missible he went back to cases where the declarant's accomplish-
ment of some act was admitted and the only question was, what
was the state of mind that accompanied it? The chief support
of the aecision is Insurance Co. v. Mosley,", a case of declarations
of present pain and of spontaneous exclamations. The declara-
tions of present pain, or presently existing state of mind, were
not used there to show that the declarant fell down stairs. That
was proved by the spontaneous exclamations.", But to uphold
the introduction of plans to leave Wichita Justice Gray relies on
the arguments used by Justice Swayne to admit declarations
of present pain. It may be true that "Wherever the bodily or
mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the
usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent
evidence." 18 But it does not follow that where such feelings
are not material to be proved the usual expressions of such
feelings are admissible. If Walters were alive his feelings on
the first of March would be insignificant. The significant point
is where he was on the seventeenth. Aside from will cases,
which as we have seen have been treated separately from other
declarations of state of mind, the remaining decisions 19 cited
in the Hillmon case are chiefly concerned with state of mind in
issue, not state of mind to prove an act. And the courts indicate
that where state of mind is in issue the declarations of the
speaker on other dates or on the same date may be admitted
to prove it. Here the bystander's recollection of the state-
16 8 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1869).
27 As to the value of these see Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence-Spontaneous Exclamations (1928) 28 CoL. L, nIv.
432.
is See Insurance Co. v. Mosley, supra note 16, at 404, quoted in Iutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hilimon, supra note 9, at 296, 12 Sup. Ct. at 913.
19 They are cases of declarations to prove a bankrupt's intent at the time
of leaving the country, showing the reasons given by a person for going to
a place; showing the intent of a man in going to the railroad; showing the
state of affections of the husband or wife in actions for criminal conversa-
tion or alienation of affections, etc.
The text-writers do not distinguish state of mind to prove an act and
state of mind to prove state of mind on the point of unavailability.
WIGMORE, op. cit. snpra note 2, § 1714; CHAMBERLAYNE, op. Cit, 81p1'a
note 2, §§ 2643, 2657. Apparently the cases do not require a showing
that the declarant is unavailable, though of course he frequently is.
In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 Pac. 552 (1919); Ott v.
Murphy, 160 Iowa,730, 141 N. W. 463 (1913); Dunham v. Cox, 81 Conn.
268, 70 Atl. 1033 (1908); Worth v. Chicago, M., & St. P. Ry., 51 Fed.
171 (C. C. A. 9th, 1892).
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ment may be better than the witness-s memory of the state
of mind. Is the bystander's recollection of the statement better
than the witness's testimony as to where he was? To hold that
it is leads to interesting conclusions as to utterances of presently
existing state of mind to prove a present or past fact. If the
statement, "I am going to leave Wichita," is more reliable than
the witness's memory years later that he had gone, then clearly
his memory of an act just completed is also more reliable than
his memory of it at the trial. A fortior, his statement of a pres-
ent fact, "I am in Crooked Creek," is more reliable than his
testimony later that he was there on March 17, 1879. According
to Mhutzwl. Life Insuramce Co. v. Hilim on, if the declarant hid
lived, his words, "I am going to leave Wichita," could have been
offered to show that he left, on the ground that his words at the
time were more trustworthy than his recollection of his presence
there. But "I am in Crooked Creek," or "I have just left Crooked
Creek," would have been inadmissible because they are not more
trustworthy than his recollection on the stand.
The absurdity of this result indicates that the hearsay excep-
tion must be justified by the supposed necessity of the evidence.
Since it is admitted even if the declarant is available, it does
not come in because of his death or absence from the jurisdiction.
Let us assume, then, that the declarant is available. His state-
ments of his present plans will be admitted because, "Those ex-
pressions are the natural reflexes of what it might be impossible
to show by other testimony. If there is such other testimony, this
may be necessary to set the facts thus developed in their true
light, and to give them their proper effect." ' : Even if we grant
that there is a necessity for admitting declarations of state of
mind to show what the state of mind of the speaker was at
the time, we find that these declarations are less useful than the
sworn statements of the individual himself under cross-examina-
tion where a fact like physical location is in issue. If the
declarant is available, he can tell where he was on March 17,
1879. There is little necessity of introducing his plan to be
somewhere on that day.
In the Hillmon case the association of ideas which produced
ambiguity on the question of trustworthiness produces the same
ambiguity on the question of necessity. Because it may be neces-
20 See Insurance Co. v. Mosley, snpra note 16, at 404, quoted in Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, szipra note 9, at 296, 12 Sup. Ct. at 913; see
also Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay R.le (1912) 26 HL nv. L.
REv. 146, 154. If the declarant takes the stand the e.xtrajudicial state-
ments, if in writing as in the Hillmon case, could be used to refresh his
recollection; or if witness proves recalcitrant the statements, under the
general rule, might be offered to impeach him. WIr.oRE, op. eit. ,'pra
note 2, §§ 905, 758.
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sary where state of mind is in issue to admit declarations of it,
Justice Gray suggests that that necessity exists wherever state
of mind might prove the commission of an act. When a man
complains that he feels dizzy, his complaint may conceivably be
necessary to show that he did feel dizzy. When he says he is
going to leave Wichita, his declaration is unnecessary to
prove that he did, because by hypothesis he can take the stand
and prove it. To claim a necessity for such declarations as those
admitted in the Hillmon case when the declarant is available is
to overthrow again the distinction between utterances to prove
future and past or present facts. If declarations of state of
mind are necessary to prove a future act when the speaker is
in the jurisdiction, there is no reason why they are not equally
necessary to prove an act now existing or one completed long
since.
There was, however, a real necessity for the introduction of
this evidence in the Hillmon case. Walters was dead, or at least
unavailable. The decision might have stopped on the question of
the necessity of proving intention in this way with the words,
"After his death, there can hardly be any other way of proving
it..." 11 This element in the case also disposes of the matter of
trustworthiness. The contrast in this view is no longer between
a man's statement on the stand of his physical location on a given
date, and his extrajudicial statement of where he planned to be
on that date. It is now between that extrajudicial statement
and no evidence from him at all. Whatever reflections may be
made on the trustworthiness of such a statement, most students
of evidence would be inclined to prefer some statement to none,
leaving the jury to estimate the worth of what is admitted.
It is significant that the only cases relied on by Justice Gray
in which words are used to prove state of mind to prove an act
are cases in which the declarant is dead. And the only non-tes-
tamentary case directly in point, Hunter v. State,22 was one in
which the declarant was the victim of the murder for which the
defendant was on trial. In the three will cases cited,23 the
speaker was of course no longer in a position to take the stand.
The reliance of the court on Insurance Co. v. Mosley 24 and cases
where state of mind was in issue indicates that the use of the
phrase "state of mind" has obscured the real necessity, the un-
availability of the declarant. The unavailability of other evi-
21 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, supra note 9, at 295, 12 Sup.
Ct. at 912. Seligman, op. cit. supra note 20, overlooks the necessity created
by the unavailability of the defendant.
2240 N. J. L. 495 (1878).
23 Sugden v. St. Leonards, supra note 1; Woodward v. Goulstone, supra
note 3; Shailer v. Bumstead, 99 Mass. 112 (1868).
24 Supra note 16.
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dence of state of mind is significant only when coupled with
the other, except when state of mind is material to be proved.
State of mind becomes important in the Hillma'n case because
Walters was not on hand to tell where he was on March 17, 1879.
Had he been on hand he would not have been asked what his
plans were from March first to March fifth. He would have
been asked his address on the seventeenth.
If the necessity that exists for the admission of a declara-
tion of a presently existing state of mind to prove a future act
is the unavailability of the declarant, the same necessity should
suggest the admission of such declarations to prove past or pres-
ent facts. This is, of course, the result in will cases under the
majority rule.25 Where the speaker is dead, "I am going to leave
Wichita" is no more necessary to show his location at a certain
time than his statement that he has just been there or a letter
saying that he is there. The declarant is equally dead in all
cases. If it is necessary to use the phrase "state of mind" to
justify the admission of this evidence, the will cases show that
it can be done. Those cases frequently hold that "'Iv will is at
my lawyer's office" is admissible to show the state of mind of the
testator, from which is inferred the execution and the continued
existence of the document. Whether this results in a new ex-
ception to the hearsay rule for the declarations of unavailable
persons even though not against interest, or is regarded as an
extension of the existing exception for declarations of presently
existing state of mind seems unimportant, except that verbal
difficulties may be avoided by admitting all such statements, ir-
respective of technical alignment within the category "state of
mind."
The first objection that has been registered against such a
development is that it breaks down the hearsay rule.12  But
the hearsay rule is already broken down by some thirteen excep-
tions- to which this would not greatly add. It is said that
if memory is admitted as a state of mind, then the hearsay
rule is gone. But it is now gone in will cases where the only state
of mind that the testator can be thought of as describing by his
words is his memory or belief. If in non-testamentary cases the
exception is confined to situations where the declarant is un-
available, the innovation is no more startling than the admission
of post-testamentary declarations. Indeed it is not as startling.
A will is a solemn document, the requirements for which are
25See supra note 2.
26 See Seligman, op. cit. supra note 20, at 156-158; see also reply of
Maguire, infra note 57.
2
7WIGMOE, op. cit. suyra note 2. Hinton lists nine in his casebuolz,
and Maguire the same number in his. Our suggestion is substantially
the Massachusetts hearsay statute, Gen. Laws (1921) c. 2T3, § 65.
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prescribed by law. Everybody knows the weakness of parol evi-
dence of any kind in will contests. It was to be expected that
every effort would be made to limit the scope of such testimony.
Instead the declarations of the testator at any time are freely
admissible.
In the second place it is urged that statements of present or
past facts are usually cast in testimonial form, so that the jury
may attach too much weight to them.28 How true this is in will
cases. "My -will is in that box" is a direct assertion of the exist-
ence and location of the will. "I am writing from Crooked
Creek" is a direct assertion of the location of the writer. Unless
there is an overwhelming difference between will cases and other
cases where the declarant is unavailable, it would appear that in
will cases the courts have faced or disregarded the testimonial
form of the declarations when used to prove past or present
facts. They might do the same when a will is not involved.
It may be argued that even when the declarant is unavailable
there is no real reason for permitting evidence of his declara-
tions showing his state of mind. Assuming that state of mind
is relevant to show a future act, do we need to admit declara-
tions in order get it? When the speaker is alive and in the juris-
diction, he may, except in Alabama,29 testify to his own previous
state of mind.3° Where he is unavailable the only method of
discovering it is through his "countenance, attitude, or gesture,
or by sounds or words" n as reported by others. Looks and
gestures are a trifle inadequate as reflecting state of mind. Par-
ticularly is this true where the opinion rule operates as vigor-
ously as it does in most states. One may describe the appearance
of another, but may not conclude that he was joking, angry, or
in the fear of death.3 2 Under these circumstances, the words of
the declarant are of such importance as to induce the creation of
an exception to the hearsay rule to provide for their admission.
The logic of this legal analysis cuts both ways. We may argue
on the basis of it, either for the admission of all statements,
regardless of tense, when the declarant is unavailable and his
28 Book Review (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rav. 513, 519; Chafee, The Prog-
ress of the Law, 1919-1921: Evidence (1922) 35 HARv. L. Ra.V. 302, 443.
29 Lawler v. State, 115 So. 420 (Ala. 1928); (1924) 22 Micu. L. Rv.
486.
8 Powell v. Powell, 260 Mass. 505, 157 N. E. 639 (1927); State v.
Asal, 79 Mont. 385, 256 Pac. 1071 (1927); Cannon v. Seattle Title Trust
Co., 142 Wash. 213, 252 Pac. 699 (1927); People v. Sheasbey, 82 Cal.
App. 459, 255 Pac. 836 (1927); Smith v. State, 262 Pac. 507 (0kla. Cr.
App. 1928).
31 See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, supra note 9, at 295, 12 Sup.
"Ct. at 912.
32 State v. Holland, 193 N. C. 713, 138 S. E. 8 (1927); Prince v.
State, 215 Ala. 276, 110 So. 407 (1926); State v. Phillips, 279 S. W. 749
(Mo. App. 1926) ; cf. Hall v. State, 216 Ala. 336, 113 So. 64 (1927).
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state of mind an important link in the chain of evidence; or for
the abolition of the hearsay exception. In the first instance
we are merely raising the wills exception to the dignity of a
general rule based on necessity due to unavailability not only
of the declarant, but of other evidence on an important point;
in the second the hearsay rule, based upon the untrustworthiness
of all extrajudical statements is maintained in full force. Before
deciding which major premise to accept it is pertinent to inquire
into the relative probative force of the legal "state of mind"
to prove an act in the future, present or past. There is not
only logic but legal precedent for either course of action. In
order to reach a rational conclusion we must consider the legal
concept in its psychological setting.
It is clear that something which lawyers call state of mind, the
very existence of which is denied by many respectable psycholo-
gists, is regarded as an integral part of the law. The preceding
paragraphs, which assume the legal existence of this phenom-
enon, in no way attempt to define it. The courts do not attempt
to define it; the text-writers rarely. It is a primary datum of
experience, like consciousness. As we have observed, the elusive
state of mind is legally evidenced by words, although the infer-
ence is not directly from the words to the mental state. It is
rather through the introspection of twelve jurymen. The juror,
on hearing the report of the state of mind of another, says
to himself in effect, "Had I spoken thus, it would have meant
that I intended so." The only guarantee of the accuracy of
the result is that it requires the unanimous agreement of twelve
separate int-ospectors. In those cases where the process of
introspection is not so obvious, we generally find a situation
so often repeated as to seem to warrant a direct inference
from the words to the mental state. Thus the simple assertion,
"I am going to leave Wichita," seems to be immediately taken
to mean that the speaker "intended" to leave; or the declara-
tion, "I made a will," appears to be taken directly as evi-
dence that the testator at the time "thought" he made a will, thus
possibly justifying the further inference that the will was in
fact made. In the law, then, words are said to indicate mental
states. Our problem now is to ascertain to what psychological
picture these legal assumptions correspond and whether the
two disciplines cast any illumination upon each other.
The classic method of psychology, like that of law, is introspec-
tive,33 words playing a part of the utmost importance. In order
to determine, for instance, what differences in light intensity
= See TITCHENEP, TEX' BOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY (1917) 20 Ct ccq. for a
clear account and justification of introspection as a psychological method.
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were just perceptible to the subject,34 he was asked to look at a
light and tell the examiner, who was gradually increasing its in-
tensity, the precise moment at which he noticed any change.
Students of animal psychology could not, of course, depend on the
words of their subjects, and had to invent other ways of deter-
mining when a dog or cat just perceived an increase or decrease
in intensity or a change in color. Pavlov, Watson, and Lashley
elaborated a method of inquiry, entirely objective, which could
be applied not only to animals, but also to human beings. 0
From then on the use of words and the introspective method
were viewed with suspicion.30 Because of their vague inaccu-
racies, the psychologist studied not what the subject said, but
what he did. To find out if a person were emotionally upset by
a sudden sharp noise the psychologist did not ask him whether
he was upset. He felt his pulse, measured his respiration curve,
and made a chemical analysis of his blood. In general it was
found that where they could be obtained these involuntary acts
were more reliable than words because of their greater invari-
ability. There were times when a subject would honestly report
that he was quite stirred emotionally, although physiological
analysis showed him to be untouched.3 7 The advantage of the
nev- method is obvious; its limitation lies in the fact that in
its present stage of development it is applicable to only a small
part of the field covered by psychology. We are driven to less
exact methods for the most part, subject only to a statistical
check. The bulk of intelligence testing involves verbal response,38
and the whole of psychoanalysis is based upon words. The
34This experiment is a familiar part of every laboratory course.
WATSON, op. cit. infra. note 35, at 35.
35 The conditioned reflex is well described in WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY FROM
THE STANDPOINT OF A BEHAVIORST (1919) 28 et seq. Pavlov has written
a whole book about itj PAVLOV, CONDITIONED REFLEx (1928). The
phenomenon is so widely known that a detailed description of it is super-
fluous. It is enough to say that a subject (human or animal) is so trained
that, for example, his secretion of saliva increases when he is stimulated
by a light of given intensity. He can be further trained so that although
he will react to an intensity of A, A + 1 will cause no salivary flow.
Thus by decreasing the difference between the intensities of the two
stimuli, a point is reached where differential training is no longer possi-
ble. The saliva flows equally at A and A + .01. Just beyond that point,
then, are the just perceptible differences the old experiment sought to
ascertain introspectively.
3GSee, for instance, the preface to 'WATSON, op. cit. supra note 35; ibid.
39 et seq.
37 SyZ, Observations on the Unreliability of Subjective Reports of Emo-
tional Reactions (1920) 17 BRIT. JOUR. PSYC. Gen. Sect. 119-26.
88 The army tests and various revisions of the Binet are cases in point.
There are a number of non-language tests, but vastly more which use
words.
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scientific psychologist wishes it were otherwise; often he goes to
the extent of declaring that only what can be studied objectively
is the proper field of his investigation.-3 That is a position
which the lawyer and judge can hardly take in the present state
of our knowledge.
Since we cannot overlook the importance of verbal symbols,
and since it would be futile to use these symbols to spin out an
elaborate terninological dispute, let us forget the phrase state
of mind and consider the facts. If many psychologists shy away
from the term mind, let the lawyer ask them to tell him some-
thing about the relation of words to other overt acts. ''at is
the basis of the law's inference from words to deeds? If psy-
chology finds that there is a good one, the law may, if it liles,
substitute for words the term state of mind. Whether or not
there is such a thing as state of mind, except as a tertium quid,
is immaterial in this view.
A definition of a psychological act may clarify the matter
somewhat. Our musculature is in a constant state of phasic and
tonic contraction. The physiologist can isolate a single muscle
band and call each separate contraction, for his purpose, a com-
plete act. That is because he is interested for the moment only
in the chemical changes in muscle contractions. But such be-
havior is without significance psychologically, where a longer
history of an act is essential. It is sometimes possible to trace
the genesis of an adult habit pattern back to remote infancy, 9
or even, according to some psychologists, to prenatal life.4' The
stopping point of one's research into the history of an act de-
pends upon the immediate purpose. To cure a neurosis it may be
necessary to delve into the subject's earliest memories. But
when we merely wish to ascertain whether a certain event oc-
curred, our search ends when we have reached an item of be-
havior frequently if not invariably correlated with it. That item
of behavior may precede the act at issue, as the obtaining of a
passport precedes a trip abroad; or it may follow it, like the
return journey. Thus every act has a past, present, and a
future; the observable parts of that total history may be muscle
contractions, glandular secretions, or words.
Words are important, not because they indicate a state of
mind, but because they are part of a total situation. From the
words one may, perhaps, infer other parts of the situation. They
are not as accurate as a conditioned reflex would be. Besides the
variatioi in their meanings, the possibilities of lying and uncon-
scious motivation have to be faced. But the fact remains that
39 See WATSoN, op. cit. supra note 35, at 41 ct seq.
4o FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO.NALYSIS (1922) 1S Ct seq.
4" FL-UGEL THE PsYcHaoAwALYrc STUDY OF THE FM Y (192G) c. S.
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whatever the problem raised by their use, at present they are one
of the best means we have of studying the behavior of an indi-
vidual with a view to telling what he has done or is going to do.
41
This brings us back to the legal distinction between statements
to prove a future and a past or present act. Professor Chafee
has suggested as a possible psychological justification for the
distinction that "intention is a dynamic mental state with a force
of its own, like remorse, whereas memory is static, a mere reflec-
tion of past events." 43 The suggestion seems interesting, but
at the moment superfluous, because we are not concerned with
intention, mental states, remorse, or memory, but with the con-
nection between words and other overt acts. The problem is
not one of dynamics and statics, but one of the relevancy of
words to prove past, present, or future acts. In the Hilimon
case a complete account of Walters's behavior during the week
which made hini an important figure in legal history might
have been something like this: first the writing of a letter
to his fianc6e, stating that he was leaving Wichita shortly; the
packing of a bag, giving a forwarding address to the post office,
and boarding the Crooked Creek Express, if there had been
one, at two-ten. Since no doubt was cast upon the veracity of
Walters, it was reasonably safe to assume from these items that
when the two-ten arrived in Crooked Creek Walters was where
the insurance company said he was. But it is obvious that
various unforeseen events may have led to a different con-
summation of all these preparatory acts." The hack that took
our protagonist to the train may have broken down; he may have
got on the wrong train by mistake; he may have fallen off be-
fore he got to Crooked Creek. But since these events are rather
remote contingencies, it is fairly safe to let the testimony go to
the jury. Still it must be remembered that even when we have
the facts supposed in addition to his statement of his plans, there
yet remains a slight though definite possibility that he never
arrived in Crooked Creek.
There is not even that possibility when we are dealing with
statements referring to past or present facts. A letter to his
betrothed saying, "I am in Crooked Creek," or "I was in Crooked
Creek,'" allows the introduction of no remote contingencies. The
event is either happening or has happened, and no accident can
change it. Even if nothing is known of antecedent circum-
stances, even if for days before the whereabouts of the declar-
ant had been shrouded in mystery; even though nothing were
known of his errand, or his Crooked Creek address, or the date
42 That is, in fact, the method of psychoanalysis.
43 See Book Review (1924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 513, 519.
4 4 WOODWORTH, DYNAmIC PSYCHOLOGY (1918) 36 et seq.
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of his arrival, the statement in the present or past tense would
be more reliable than an equally honest statement in the future
tense.45 As we have seen, the courts realize this and act upon the
realization in will cases; there is no logical or psychological
reason for not extending the rule to cover all statements made
either subsequent to or contemporaneous with the act in issue.
The words are not cause or effect of the main act; they are part
of the total situation, with a reasonably high probability of cor-
relation with the other parts. Since the probability is only
reasonably high, it might be misleading to admit the statements
without corroboration. But when corroborated they are just
as valuable, whether referring to past, present, or future.
In the situation that we have been discussing the stimuli and
responses have been on the conscious level. But another situa-
tion is possible and is represented by such a case as Grccna-erc v.
Filby. 16 The defendant argued that the deceased had committed
suicide. The plaintiff contended that he had been run over by a
train without any desire for that consummation on his part, and
offered evidence that on leaving the saloon where he had been
drinking he told his friends that he was going to ldss the wife
and babies and go to bed. That he may have been deliberately
lying is of course a possibility. But the probability in
this instance is rather more difficult to grasp. Indeed the ex-
planation about to be set forth is more than occasionally met by
the derisive comment of distinguished psychologists. It cannot
be too strongly pointed out that the explanation is merely an
hypothesis; it does not pretend to be either complete or exclusive;
it does not aim to furnish a criterion for the admissibility of
words as proof in certain situations. Its only purpose is to indi-
cate a possibility of which the tribunal should be aware.
The explanation is based on the psychoanalytic theory that not
all motivation is conscious.Y1 To avoid other terminological pit-
falls we may say that although frequently a state of readiness 4
in a human mechanism is accurately reflected by the verbal ex-
pressions emanating therefrom, there are times when the words
45 Any doubt cast upon the veracity of Walters renders all three state-
ments equally untrustworthy. The fallibility of memory is also important
in this connection. For all spoken hearsay statements must be remembered
by some one on the stand. To the psychologist that is the real reason for
the rule, not its untrustworthiness on other grounds.
- Greenacre v. Filby, 276 Ill. 294, 114 N. E. 536 (1916); (1017) 11
ILL. L. REv. 573; (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 798.
47 The aim of psychoanalysis, in contradistinction to that of the other
forms of psychology, is exploration of the unconscious instead of the con-
scious mind. See, among many others, FE-m, op. cit. sitpra note 40, par-
ticularly 82-93. There are too many general expositions to make it worth
while listing them here.
4S WOODWORTH, supra note 44, at 35 et seq.
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give an impression exactly opposite to the actual situation. The
psychoanalytic explanation is that the motivation is unconscious;
that a mental censor 4 9 prevents the real reason for a course of
activity from becoming conscious. We are not now interested
in this hypothesis. Our sole desire is to study the observable
facts reported by psychoanalysts to see the relationship between
their facts and the case of Mr. Greenacre.
There are a number of cases like the following. A woman an-
nounced that she was going abroad to become a nurse in the
American army. She added that she was going to confine her
attention to blind soldiers. Her conscious reason was her great
pity for the unfortunate blind. But more study of her case
brought out the fact that she thought she was terribly homely,
and chose the blind for that reason.0 An old bachelor had the
strange habit of catching a certain insect, keeping it for a few
weeks and then throwing it away. He had no scientific interest
in the subject, and could give no reason for his strange collecting
mania. On inquiry it was found that the insect was of the lobalis
species, designated in the bachelor's native dialect as "maiden."
His unconscious motive in this case differed greatly from the
mere desire to collect insects. 1 A woman forgot the married
name of one of her best friends. She honestly tried to remember
it, and gave all sorts of sincere reasons for her lapse of memory.
The real reason appeared later on when she admitted that she
intensely disliked the husband of her friend, and had strongly
objected to the marriage.52 Innumerable other examples might
be given, but perhaps these will serve to make the point clear.
The point is simply that sometimes the reasons honestly given
for behavior do not reveal the actual motive. Regardless of why
this is so the fact is undeniable. For our present purpose only
the fact is important; a whole controversial literature has grown
up about the explanation.
This fact does not affect the general relevancy of words to
prove state of mind. It becomes important only sometimes, and,
it might be added, only with some people. How can these times
and these people be discovered? Disregarding unusual situations
where the psychoanalytic approach might conceivably have value,
we shall for the present best answer this question by examining
cases which are fairly frequent and indicating their analogy to
the psychoanalytic examples already given. The two kinds of
cases that stand out are those of suicide, and those of threats
to prove an act of violence. Suicide, both statistically and psy-
chologically in our civilization may be considered an abnormal
49 FREUD, supra note 40, at 248 et seq.
50 BRiLL, FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF PSYCnoANALYSIS (1921) 98.
51 Ibid. 103.
U FRsUD, op. cit. supra note 40, at 41.
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actz 3 and the expressions concerning it on the part of those who
attempt or commit it should be received with skepticism. Death,
one's own or that of somebody else, is a common infantile sym-
bolic way of solving vexatious problems." Almost any one cap
resurrect from his past day dreams in which his own self-in-
flicted death played some part. At times these dreams develop
into ridiculous, abortive attempts which are more a mechanism
for getting attention than a death wish. An adolescent girl, for
instance, having resolved to end everything, ate a box of aspirin
tablets, and then dramatically lay down to die. Another neg-
lected by her family attempted suicide in their presence but con-
trived to be saved in the nick of time. For days thereafter she
was the center of attention,
On the other hand, there are cases more nearly like Grecnaere
v. Filby G where the suicidal impulse is unconscious; indeed in
some of them the subject seems to love life only too well. But
we find him constantly facing danger, stupidly at times. Inten-
sive study of him over a long period may reveal the hitherto un-
conscious wish to die. From the words alone in Grecnacrc v,.
Filby it is impossible to tell whether that was such a case. Those
words may or may not have indicated that he intended to commit
suicide. The same correlation that exists in the ordinary case
between words and acts cannot be looked for here. But it must
not be assumed that the words always mean the opposite from
what they seem to mean. They may mean exactly what they say.
It is important, therefore that the tribunal be able to differen-
tiate cases where the probable correlation between words and
other overt acts is high from those where it is low, or possibly
negative. In the doubtful ones it is necessary to insist on more
corroborative evidence and frequently evidence of a special sort,
amounting to an abbreviated case history of the declarant.
Cases in which a threat is used to prove the future commission
of the act threatened also belong to what we may call the phycho-
analytic type of situation57 Very often it amounts to nothing
more than compensation for a bruised ego. A person, suffering
from what one school of psychiatry has described as an inferior-
ity complex frequently talks big to justify himself not only to
53 By abnormal act we mean either an act seldom performed in a given
civilization, or any act of an abnormal person.
- FREUD, op cit. supra note 40, at 232, 119.
55These cases are taken from unpublished psychiatric material.
SSupra note 46.
r7 Threats as evidence are of sufficient importance to warrant fuller
treatment. We are discussing them from other points of view in a subzk-
quent article. In the present paper we are confining our attention to those
threats upon which doubt may be cast because of the discrepancy between
the real and expressed wish.
297
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the world but to himself as wellA8 The probative force of that
sort of threat would seem to be relatively slight and therefore
to require much evidence in corroboration. Again it must be
insisted that the evidence, though, weak may not be weak enough
to be excluded. Only the court should be thoroughly aware
of the relative strength of that type of evidence as compared
with others.
We find, then, that any dispute between lawyer and psycholo-
gist as to the meaning and significance of state of mind can be
avoided by considering, not the term, but the facts which the law-
yer takes it to describe, a result which allows the lawyer to make
what use of the phrase he can in order to admit relevant facts
without breaking the rules of the game. The courts are justi-
fied in their belief that a high correlation exists between words
and other overt acts. But they have probably not gone far
enough. Their insistence in non-testamentary cases that the
words should precede the act at issue is open to question.
It seems safe and rational to establish a special exception to
the hearsay rule for non-testamentary cases analogous to that
now existing in most jurisdictions for utterances relating to a
will.59 But the variability of words may make it inadvisable
to let them stand alone, especially in dealing with threats of
violence and declarations of an intention to commit suicide. In
these cases counsel should make every effort to obtain as com-
plete a history of the declarant as possible, and the tribunal
should be wary of accepting the statements at their face value.
58 For discussion of that type of behavior see ADLER, NEUIiOTIC CON-
STITUTION (1921) 100, 133, and ADLER, UNDERSTANDING HUMAN NATURE
(1927) 212.
59 Cf. Maguire, The Hilimon Case-Thirty-three Years After (1925)
38 HAnv. L. Ray. 709, 732; "The obscure elaborations of the Iillmon case
prove for the hundredth time that we ought to have further intelligent legis-
lation to clear the old deadwood from the evidential field."
We should perhaps add that in our proposed extension of the hearsay
exception to make admissible presently existing state of mind to prove
past or present facts, we should expect the judge to have the same dis-
cretion to exclude remote and suspicious statements, as he has in dealing
with utterances referring to the future.
